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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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STRANG, 'VENDY HARVEY and
MINDAL YN GREEN, by her
guardian ad litem, STEVEN GREEN,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
12482

Brief of Defendant-Appellant

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the granting of a summary
judgment to plaintiff-respondent decreeing that the
policy of automobile public liability insurance issued
by respondent afforded no insurance coverage to Wendy
HarYev the sister-in-law and sister of Ronald Strang
.'
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claim is made by appellant that an insurance policy
covering another vehicle owned by Mrs. Hamberlin
applied to the J;-,alcon automobile because of the time
lapse from the date of acquisition of that vehicle to
the date of the subject accident. The record in this case
is somewhat brief and is basically confined to the declaratory judgment complaint, answer of the defendants, the judgment of the lower court, four short
depositions, that of Ronald Strang, Wendy Harvey,
Debra Hamberlin and Jacqueline Hamberlin, her
mother, and the insurance policy to be interpreted.
During the course of appellant's brief reference will be
made to Exhibit 1, which is the policy to be interpreted,
and each of the depositions by name and page.
On the date in question, Debra Hamberlin was age

1.5 and was not a licensed driver. Mrs. Hamberlin had

left the keys to the Falcon home on the drainboard so
that her 20-year-old son, Debra's brother, could move
the car, at her request, within the driveway. Debra had,
on several occasions, taken the Falcon, advising her
friends that the car was hers and that she had her
mother's permission to drive it. This was unknown to
the mother. On this date, 'Vendy Harvey was a guest
at the residence of a common girl friend who was a
neighbor of Debra. Wendy had an errand to run and
Debra volunteered to drive her on the errand (Harvey
deposition, p. 4). During the course of driving on this
occasion and on the previous two occasions, Debra had
publicly declared that the subject Falcon was her automobile (Harvey deposition, p. 5). On the date in
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and Kathryn Strang, defendants named in this case,
for negligent acts arising out of driving the subject non.
owned automobile.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal of the lower court judgment decreeing no insurance coverage and the entry
of a judgment on appellant's motion for summary judgment decreeing that respondent's insurance policy applied to the subject accident in the event liability exists
on the part of 'V endy Harvey.

STATElVIENT OF FACTS
On the afternoon of July 30, 1970, the minor
appellant, Mindalyn Green, was playing at her residence in an apartment complex in Granger, Utah with
some of her friends. She was injured as a result of
being struck by an automobile driven by Wendy
Harvey, a 15-year-old nonlicensed driver, who appellants claim lost control of the vehicle she was driving.
Wendy was a resident of the Strang household and had
been for approximately five years, legal custody having
been given to her sister, Kathryn Strang.
The automobile in question was a 1964 Falcon
owned and registered to one Jacqueline Hamberlin,
a widow. Mrs. Hamberlin maintained no policy of
public liability insurance covering said vehicle and no
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Absent exclusionary riders, Wendy Harvey is an
insured regardless of age or no driver's license under
the Strang family auto policy. State Farm Mutual v.
Walker, (Texas, 1960), 334 S.W.2d 458.
Exhibit 1 being the insurance policy in question at
page 3 contains the following language, some of which
is set forth in plaintiff's complaint for a declaratory
judgment. The Strangs are the owners of the liability
policy in question and Wendy Harvey is a resident
of their household.
"USE
OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES. If the named insured is a person or
persons, and if during the policy period such
named insured owns a motor vehicle covered by
this policy and classified as 'pleasure and business', such insurance as is afforded by this policy
with respect to the owned motor vehicle under:
( 1) coverages A and B (public liability and
property damage) apply to the use of a nonowned automobile by:

(a) the first person named in the declarations,
or
( b) if residents of the same household, his
spouse or the relatives of either, and
( c)
( 2)

***
***

(not applicable)
(not applicable)

PROVIDED SUCH USE, OPERATION
OR OCCUPANCY IS WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE O"\VNER OR PERSON IN LAT¥FUL POSSESSION OF
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question, while driving, the following conversation took
place:
"A. Well, we were driving and I said something
like 'It would be fun to drive' and Debbie said.
''V ell, here, do you want to drive?' and I said'
'Yes,' " (Harvey Deposition, p. 5)
'
thereby resulting in Wendy's driving the Falcon. It was
not until after the accident that 'V endy first met Mrs.
Hamberlin and was advised that Debra did not have
permission to take the subject automobile (Harvey deposition p. 7) .
Respondent becomes involved in this lawsuit since
it had issued a policy of liability insurance to the Strangs
which insures \V endy Harvey as a bona fide resident
of the household under the omnibus clause of that policy.
The subject insurance policy contains no exclusionary
clause for under age or nonlicensed drivers and, therefore, that defense is not available and has not been
raised by State Farm. The matter to be decided by this
Court is solely whether or not Wendy qualifies as an
insured under State Farm's omnibus clause on the facts
of this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT ON APPEAL
THE LO,VER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING STATE FARM WAS NOT AN INSURER OF WENDY HARVEY AGAINST
NEGLIGENT ACTS OF DRIVING.
4

SUCH AU1101l10BILE AND IS JVl1 1IIIN
THE SCOPE OF SUCH PERMISSION."
(emphasis added)
It is admitted that the operation or occupancy of
the vehicle causing the serious personal injuries to
Mindalyn Green was not with the permission of Mrs.
Jacqueline Hamberlin, the owner of the vehicle. However, appellant submits that her daughter, Debra, was
a person in lawful possession of the automobile and the
several excerpts from the record quoted in the Statement of Facts places the use at the time of injury
"within the scope of such permission" (Debra's permission) and the question of the lawfulness of Debra's
possession is the point on which this case should turn.
The Court will notice that two classifications of persons
can grant permission to drive the auto as the clause is
in the disjunctive.

Taking public policy considerations first, for whose
benefit is a policy of public liability insurance intended?
Appellant submits the intended benefit is to be derived
from the name of the policy-public liability-and the
interests of the public for whose design and benefit such
policies are written should receive first consideration.
Mrs. Hamberlin admittedly has no liability under the
facts of this case. Her daughter, Debra, could possibly
have some joint liability with the driver under a theory
of negligent entrustment if the facts could be established in support of that theory. To permit State Farm
to stand in the shoes of Mrs. Hamberlin under a stolen
vehicle theory when the vehicle has been used by her
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own daughter upon representations to her friends as
to ownership and entitlement to use same, as evidenced
by her past conduct (Harvey Deposition, p. 8, commencing with Line 14), is unconscionable.
Section 41-12-21 (c), Utah Code Annotated
( 1953), as amended, sets forth minimum standards of
insurance policy coverage and reads as follows :
"Such operator's policy of liability insurance
shall insure the person named as insured therein
against loss from the liability imposed upon him
by law for damages arising out of the use by
him of any vehicle not owned by him . . . "
Since 'iV endy Harvey comes under the classification
of an insured under the Strang policy, any attempt on
the part of State Farm to claim noncoverage would be
in direct conflict with the foregoing statute, and its purpose, which is to protect the public. Further, any clause
which purports to limit this protection should be declared
void.
Mrs. Hamberlin did not treat the taking of the
automobile as stolen for purposes of criminal action.
(Jacqueline Hamberlin Deposition, p. 13)
"Q. And I trust that you did not consider the car
stolen?

A. Well, they didn't have it with my permission.
Q. That wasn't the question. Did you consider the

car stolen?

A. Yes, I did.
7

Q. You did?
A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did you turn it in to the police?

A. No, I didn't turn it in. I told them at the scene
of the accident.
Q. That she had it without your permission.
A. vVithout my permission.

Q. But you did not turn it in as a stolen vehicle?
A. No.

Q. And did you ever file any charges ?
A. No, I did not file charges, I called my attorney."
Notwithstanding .Mrs. Hamberlin's personal views
on the unauthorized use of her automobile by Debra
and Wendy, according to the great weight of authority,
she would not have had a civil cause of action in tort
against her d~ter for wrongful taking of her car,
60 A.L.R. 2d /,
~Therefore, the permission for operation, for purposes of interpreting the Strang policy,
must necessarily exist in Debra.
Illustrative of insurance company liability under
auto public liability insurance clauses for drivers, not·
withstanding the criminal taking of the car by the
driver, which car was the instrumentality causing the
injury, is the case of State Farm Mutual v. W allcer,
supra, at p. 461. In Sperling v. Great American· Indemnity Company, (1960) 7 N.Y. 2d 442, 199 N.Y.S.
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2d 465, 166 N.E. 2d 482, 83 A.L.R. 2d 929, a 16-yearold member of a household stole a vehicle and thereafter
caused injuries to other persons. In holding the insurance company liable for the actions of the household
member under a more gross situation than the joy ride
facts of the instant case, the New York Court, after
observing the common and oft cited rule of resolving
any ambiguities against insurance companies, made the
following observation at page 487:
"The insurer further contends that it would be
against public policy to require it to pay the bulk
of the judgment recovered against Christine,
since she 'would accordingly be the beneficiary
of the result of her own crimes'. This argument
is foreclosed by the decision of this court in Messersmith v. American Fid. Co. (232 N.Y. 161,
133 N.E. 432, 19 A.L.R. 876).
"There was no proof in the wrongful death
action that Christine intentionally collided with
decedent's car nor were there allegations to that
effect in the complaint. On the contrary, the complaint was framed solely in the terms of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and the
judgment in favor of plaintiff, as the insurer concedes, was based solely on 'the negligence of the
infant defendant'. The fact that Christine had
previously misappropriated the car with .w~ic~
she negligently caused the death of plamhff s
husband, was wholly irrelevant in the wrongful
death action since 'Injuries are accidental or
the opposite for the purpose of indemnity according to the quality of ,the results. rather than. the
quality of the causes. Messersmith v. American
Fid. Co., supra, 232 N.Y. at page 165, 133 N.E.
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at page 433; emphasis supplied. (See, also, D:wis
v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 356 Mich.
454, 96 N.,V. 2d 760, and Sky v. Keystone Mut.
Cas. Co., 150 Pa. Super. 613, 29 A. 2d 230).
"As Judge Cardozo further pointed out in the
JYiessersmith case (supra, 232 N.Y. at pages
163, 164<, 133 N.E. at page 432), liability in tort
for the negligent operation of a vehicle 'can
seldom, if ever, be incurred without fault that is
also crime', and 'To restrict insurance to cases
where liability is incurred without fault of the
insured would reduce indemnity to a shadow.'
The insurer here has been called upon to indemnify Christine against the consequences of her
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle,
not against the criminal consequences stemming
from her willful misappropriation of the vehicle.
The manner in which she acquired the vehicle
had nothing whatever to do with her liability for
its negligent operation."
We submit that so far as Wendy Harvey is concerned, she was not a tort feasor in accepting permission to drive the car,and the maxim of de minimis non
curat lex applies since the manner in which Debra acquired the car had nothing to do with Wendy's negligent
operation of it.

Western Casualty and Surety v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., et al., 26 U.2d 50, 484 P.2d l180, does not apply
if raised in respondent's brief, since it is Wendy Harvey
who is to be insured, not the automobile causing injury.
Appellant anticipates reliance of State Farm on
the case of Ashton v. Joyner, 17 U.2d 162, 406 P.2d 306.
That case involved the interpretation of a theft under a
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comprehensive damage clause of an insurance policy.
Claim had been made by the insured for the cost of
repairs for damages sustained to his truck, which had
been taken without permission by his under-aged son.
This Court held under the theft portion of the insurance
policy in question and under the facts of that case, the
company was liable. The rationale contained in that case
is correct under the terms of the United Pacific policy
to be interpreted.
Directing the Court's attention to page 7, Exhibit
1, Use of Non-Owned Vehicles (Physical Damage Section) , similar coverage terminology is contained in the
State Farm policy presently under review applying to
physical damage loss, and is basically the same as that
contained in the public liability provision of Exhibit
1 applicable to non-owned vehicles quoted at the beginning of Argument in this brief. This policy thus differs
from the United Pacific policy considered in the Ashton
case as evidenced in the briefs on file and this difference
is the governing factor in this case.
State Farm's policy, under which appellants contend 'Vendy Harvey is an insured, is not a "standard
form auto policy". Automobile Liability Insurance Cases,
Standard Provisions, Isjord and Austin, (Kansas City:
E. L. Mendenhall, Inc., 1964). As previously mentioned,
two classes of persons can grant permission for use of
a non-owned vehicle, i.e., owner or person in lawful
possession of such vehicle. This terminology differs from
the more common coverage agreements contained in
11

"standard form auto policies", applying coverage to
non-owned automobiles. They generally provide coverage ( 1) to the named insured; ( 2) to any relative (member of the household) , but only with respect to private
passenger automobiles or trailers, provided the actual
use thereof is with the permission of the owner; e.g.,
Gray v. International Service Insurance Company,
386 P.2d 249; McMichael v. American Insurance Company, 351 F.2d 665 (1965); Sperling v. Great American Indemnity Company, supra, at p. 484.
CONCLUSION
Since State Farm has selected the terminology under
which it accepts liability for the negligent acts of its
insureds, and Wendy Harvey qualifies as an insured,
permission having been granted her to operate a vehicle,
her own policy of liability insurance should apply to
protect her and compensate the public, including but
not limited to, Mindalyn Green for injuries sustained,
proximately resulting from her negligence.
Respectfully submitted,
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON
Robert M. McRae
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
707 Boston Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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